The Decision That Made Patton Ignore Allied Doctrine — And Win

Описание: In the summer of 1944, as Allied forces finally broke out of the Normandy hedgerows and began their advance across France, General George S. Patton made a decision that would define his legacy and change the course of the war in Western Europe. It was a decision that flew in the face of established Allied doctrine, that contradicted the explicit orders of his superiors, and that risked not just his career but potentially the entire Allied campaign in France. Yet it was also a decision that led to one of the most spectacular military advances in history and hastened the defeat of Nazi Germany. Today we’re going to explore that decision, why Patton made it, how he justified it to himself and others, and why history has largely vindicated his choice even though it violated almost every principle of orthodox military doctrine.

To understand Patton’s decision, we first need to understand what Allied doctrine actually prescribed in the summer of 1944. Allied operational doctrine, as it had evolved through the North African, Sicilian, and Italian campaigns, emphasized methodical advance, maintenance of continuous front lines, systematic clearing of enemy forces, and above all, secure supply lines. This doctrine reflected the influence of British military thinking, which had been shaped by the experience of World War One and the imperative of avoiding another bloodbath of attrition. It also reflected practical concerns about the limitations of Allied logistics, particularly the challenge of supplying armies advancing far from their supply bases.