Unity of Command II - Ardennes 44. Hard Mode, Sonnenwende #6 Historical (H)

Описание: Guderian's original conception was operationally sound given impossible constraints. German forces would attack southward from the Pomeranian-Brandenburg border toward the Oder River, striking into the right flank of Zhukov's 1st Belorussian Front. The objectives were to cut off Soviet forces in the Küstrin bridgehead, disrupt preparations for the Berlin offensive, and force Soviet withdrawal from advanced positions.


The plan required surprise, concentration of force, and rapid exploitation. It assumed German forces could achieve local superiority through positioning even lacking overall numerical advantage. It required Soviet forces to be genuinely vulnerable on this flank rather than prepared for counterattack.

And critically, it required competent execution by high command.
Himmler's involvement guaranteed planning difficulties. He insisted on unrealistic objectives, demanded commitments that exceeded available forces, and refused to acknowledge operational limitations. Professional officers attempted to inject reality but faced the impossible position of correcting a superior who held both military command and political power as Reichsführer-SS and Hitler's confidant.


The detailed planning fell to professional staff officers who understood the mission's near-impossibility. Intelligence indicated Soviet forces were aware of German concentrations and preparing defenses. Aerial reconnaissance showed Soviet positions strengthening daily. Logistics assessments warned that fuel and ammunition stocks were barely adequate for the initial attack, let alone sustained operations. Weather forecasts predicted continuing winter conditions with frozen ground transitioning to spring mud.
Every practical assessment indicated the operation would achieve limited local success at best before Soviet reserves contained and crushed the attack. The professional military judgment was that Sonnenwende might disrupt Soviet preparations temporarily but could not fundamentally alter the strategic situation. Yet no one in the German command structure could acknowledge this reality to Hitler or Himmler without risking accusations of defeatism.

As soon as the offensive began, fuel emerged as the critical constraint. German mechanized units began the attack with barely adequate fuel loads. No operational reserves existed for sustained operations. By February 17, panzer commanders reported fuel levels dropping to critical levels. Units that achieved local breakthroughs couldn't exploit for lack of fuel. Tank companies halted not from enemy action but from empty fuel tanks. The operational mobility that made German armor dangerous evaporated.

The offensive was indeed a failure, the Soviets soon launched their own offensive and occupied all of Pomerania in a few weeks, while the Germans tried desperately to evacuate civilians and their own units (oepration Hannibal,already mentioned before)