David P. Myatt

Описание: Presentation of Priorat Workshop in Theoretical Political Science (Falset, Spain - June 6-8, 2013). For further information, visit the BBVA Foundation site: http://www.fbbva.es/TLFU/tlfu/esp/are...

A Theory of Protest Voting
David P. Myatt
LONDON BUSINESS SCHOOL

I study a model of protest voting: the supporters of a candidate for office seek to restrict her power or to send her a message by casting protest votes against her; however, if the protest is too large then she loses to a disliked opponent. I find that protest votes are strategic substitutes, and that protest voting reacts negatively to voters' expectations about the true enthusiasm for the protest. An increase in the candidate's popularity (and so a reduction in the desire for a successful protest relative to the wish to see her elected) is offset by increased protest voting. If the candidate infers her true popularity from the protest vote and responds endogenously, then a rise in her popularity can increase protest voting by enough to harm her performance at the ballot box.

David P. Myatt
David P. Myatt is Professor of Economics at the London Business School. Previously he was a fellow of Nuffield College at the University of Oxford. He received his PhD from the University of Oxford and Nuffield College. He is on the editorial board of Quarterly Journal of Political Science and former editor of The Economic Journal. He is a research fellow of the CEPR and consultant to various organizations, especially concerning bidding strategies in spectrum auctions. His research interests in economics include game theory, macroeconomic coordination, and theoretical industrial organization; and in political science they include voting, leadership and executive performance. He has published papers in leading international journals of economics and political science such as Review of Economics Studies, American Political Science Review, and American Economic Review.