The Quest for Decisive Victory EPI 8: The Challenge of Hybrid Warfare

Описание: In this episode of The Quest for Decisive Victory series, we unpack Vietnam as a “classic” hybrid conflict—one where revolutionary organization, clandestine political control, information warfare, guerrilla violence, and conventionalforces functioned as a single strategic system.


 


We begin with Martin Clemis’ explanation of how the United States moved from advisory support to full-scale intervention, and why credibility, containment, and incremental escalation narrowed Washington’s options over time. From there, we shift into the architecture of revolutionary war—how cadres, coercion, shadow governance, guerrillas, and main forces combined to pressure the South Vietnamese state at every level simultaneously. Dale Andrade then challenges the simplistic postwar lesson that Vietnam was “lost because the U.S. fought the wrong (conventional) war,” arguing instead that American leaders confronted a dual threat: insurgency and main-force war, fused by Hanoi into a coherent design. We close with MACV’s attempt to define “pacification” as an operational concept—linking security, intelligence, police integration, and influence to the practical work of extending state authority—and Douglas Pike’s strategic lens on Hanoi’s adaptation across phases of the conflict.


 


The throughline: Vietnam forces us to rethink how we define progress and victory. Hybrid warfare is not a menu of tactics—it is a method of integration that attacks legitimacy, fractures governance, weaponizes time, and uses violence to create political effects. If you want a sharper way to analyze today’s hybrid contests, Vietnam remains one of the most demanding classrooms.


 


This episode was created using the following reference materials:


 


Andrade, Dale. “Westmoreland Was Right: Learning the Wrong Lessons from the Vietnam War.” Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ), no. 96 (1st Quarter 2020): 134–141.






Clemis, Martin G. The Road to America’s Vietnam War: Political, Economic, and Military Aspects of U.S. Decision Making, 1950–1965. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1994.


 


Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). “The Concept of Pacification and Certain Definitions and Procedures.” Saigon: MACV, n.d.


 


Pike, Douglas. “Conduct of the Vietnam War: Strategic Factors.” 1965-1968