Nuclear Deterrence Strategies of Regional Powers | CGSR Seminar

Описание: The Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) sponsored this seminar entitled “Nuclear Deterrence Strategies of Regional Powers” on April 16, 2015, at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The seminar was presented by Vipin Narang of MIT.

Abstract:
As part of the ongoing Nuclear Crossroads Initiative, the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) is sponsoring a talk entitled “Nuclear Deterrence Strategies of Regional Powers” Following the lecture there will be a question and answer session. This is open to the Laboratory.

What strategies of nuclear deterrence do regional powers adopt and why? What effect do these choices have on regional powers' ability to deter conflict? This seminar, based on Narang's recent book "Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era," explores the variety of deterrence strategies that regional powers such as Pakistan, India, China, or South Africa have adopted and develops a theory for why they select one strategy over others. He then details how the choice of strategy affects a regional nuclear power's ability to deter conflict, exploring dynamics in South Asia in particular.

Vipin Narang is Mitsui Career Development Associate Professor of Political Science at MIT and member of MIT's Security Studies Program. He received his Ph.D. from the Department of Government, Harvard University in May 2010, where he was awarded the Edward M. Chase Prize for the best dissertation in international relations. He has been a fellow at Harvard University's Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, a predoctoral fellow at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, and a junior faculty fellow at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation. His research interests include nuclear proliferation and strategy, South Asian security, and general security studies. His book, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, was published by Princeton University Press in 2014.

DISCLAIMER: The opinions expressed here do not represent LLNL or the U.S. government.