Giorgio Vallortigara: Consciousness and cognition in the animal mind

Описание: Quite frequently consciousness in non-human animals is argued for on the basis of evidence for higher cognition. However, the presence of higher-level cognition does not make it more (or less) likely that consciousness is present too. I would discuss some paradigmatic examples related to detour behavior, number cognition and transitive inference in non-human animals noting how there is evidence that the same sophisticated cognitive feats may be accomplished by human subjects without any explicit conscious representation. I would argue that consciousness emerged in animals from adjustments in the mechanisms associated with the so-called Reafferenzprinzip (von Holst and Mittelstaedt, 1950). Reafference may provide the mechanistic basis for the distinction, first proposed by Thomas Reid (1895) and then beautifully developed by Nicholas Humphrey (1992), between sensation ( “what is happening to me “) and perception ( “what is happening out there “). Invertebrates that possess mechanisms for efference copy signals could be excellent candidates for tests of these conjectures. Humphrey, N. (1992). A History of the Mind. New York: Chatto & Windus, Simon & Schuster. von Holst, E., and Mittelstaedt, H. (1950). The reafference principle: interaction between the central nervous system and the periphery. Die Naturwissenschaften 37, 464–476. Reid, T. (1895). An Inquiry Into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense, The Philosophical Works of Thomas Reid, 8th edition, ed Sir William Hamilton (Castle Donington, United Kingdom), I, 114.

Edited by Emilio Manzotti
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