What German Generals Said About Eisenhower's Biggest Mistake

Описание: In 1946, British military historian B.H. Liddell Hart interviewed Germany's most senior commanders and asked what would have beaten them faster. Their answers were unanimous - and devastating for Allied leadership.

Drawing on post-war interrogations with von Rundstedt, Blumentritt, and von Manteuffel, this documentary examines the German assessment that Eisenhower's broad front strategy extended the war by six months. Field Marshal Rundstedt stated that a concentrated breakthrough would have torn the weak German front to pieces and ended the war in 1944. Why did Allied command choose a different path? What did that decision cost in American lives? The enemy's verdict on Allied strategy remains one of World War II's most uncomfortable truths.

Sources:
• B.H. Liddell Hart - "The Other Side of the Hill" (1948) - Post-war interviews with German generals
• National Archives - SHAEF operational records and supply allocation documents, September-October 1944
• Charles MacDonald - "A Time for Trumpets: The Untold Story of the Battle of the Bulge" (William Morrow, 1985)
• David Colley - "The Folly of Generals: How Eisenhower's Broad Front Strategy Lengthened World War II" (Casemate, 2021)
• Cornelius Ryan - "A Bridge Too Far" (Simon & Schuster, 1974) - Operation Market Garden and German assessments

Image Credits:
Falaise destruction (August 1944) courtesy German Federal Archives, CC BY-SA 3.0
Eisenhower with Allied leaders (June 1944) CC BY 3.0
Walter Model (October 1944) courtesy German Federal Archives/Theo Scheerer, CC BY-SA 3.0
Rundstedt portrait courtesy German Federal Archives, CC BY-SA 3.0
Hasso von Manteuffel courtesy German Federal Archives, CC BY-SA 3.0
Keitel signing surrender (May 1945) courtesy German Federal Archives, CC BY-SA 3.0

What German Generals Said About Eisenhower's Biggest Mistake